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UNLIMITED POWER: WHY THE PRESIDENT'S (WARRANTLESS) 
SURVEILLANCE PROGRAM IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL 
Raymond Shih Ray Ku * 
In this essay, Professor Ku explores the constitutionality of the President's 
Surveillance Program (PSP), and critiques the Bush Administration's legal 
explanations supporting wan·antless surveillance. Defenders of the pro-
gram have relied upon the President's inherent executive authority, the 
Congressional Authorization for Use of Military Force, the FISA Amend-
ment Act of 2008, and ultimately that under any of these sources of authori-
ty the warrantless surveillance authorized is consistent with the right of 
privacy protected Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. As such, Pro-
fessor Ku uses the PSP to illustrate the how and why current constitutional 
analysis both ignores and subverts "the right of the people to be secure" 
guaranteed by the Constitution. 
l. INTRODUCTION 
"The Fourth Amendment protects power not privacy."1 I wrote 
those words in the days following the terrorist attacks of 9/11, troubled that 
events would test this nation's commitment to the principle that "ours is a 
government of laws and not of men, and . . . we submit ourselves to rulers 
only if under rules."2 Fourth Amendment jurisprudence was especially 
problematic not only because it is implicated whenever the government 
seeks to investigate wrongdoing, but also because even before we declared 
war against terrorism, the Supreme Court's "reasonable expectation of pri-
vacy" approach undermined the fundamental concerns and principles that 
prompted the Amendment's adoption. At best, the Justices lost the Constitu-
tional forest for the doctrinal trees. At worst, they fundamentally shifted the 
political authority over questions of public and individual security from the 
Professor of Law, Co-Director, Center for Law, Technology & the Arts, Case Western 
Reserve University School of Law. I would like to thank my colleague Robert Strassfeld for 
inviting me to participate in this symposium as well as the editors of JIL for the hard work 
and assistance in preparing this essay for publication. This essay draws heavily from my 
prior work, The Founders' Privacy: The Fourth Amendment and the Power of Technological 
Surveillance, 86 MINN. L. REv. 1325 (2002). 
1 Raymond Shih Ray Ku, The Founders' Privacy: The Fourth Amendment and the Power 
of Technological Surveillance, 86 MINN. L. REV. 1325 (2002). 
2 Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 646 (1952) (Jackson, J., con-
curring). 
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people in both their constitutional and legislative capacity to the judiciary 
and executive, the two branches of government the framers specifically 
sought to restrain. Unfortunately, actions taken as part of the war on terror 
only confirmed my fears and exacerbated these constitutional problems. 
In 2005, the New York Times reported that the National Security 
Agency (NSA) was engaged in secret surveillance activities within the U.S.3 
Subsequently, the President and his administration confirmed and defended 
what has been dubbed the President's Surveillance Program (PSP).4 Unders-
tandably, President Bush justified this surveillance as a valuable tool in the 
war on terror. "The activities I have authorized make it more likely that 
killers like these 9/11 hijackers will be identified and located in time."5 For 
the purposes of this discussion, this essay does not question either the need 
for or the effectiveness of this program. Instead, it questions the process of 
its adoption and implementation. While the full extent of the PSP is still 
unknown, what we do know about the program, and the steps that the Bush 
Administration and Congress took in response to the public disclosure df its 
existence, place the failings of our current constitutional jurisprudence into 
stark relief. 
As I have written, the Fourth Amendment cannot be viewed in iso-
lation but must be seen as a complement to other constitutional protections 
including the doctrine of separation of powers. The Fourth Amendment and 
the definition of executive power in our constitutional separation of powers 
protect the public from arbitrary and unlimited executive power. The need 
for this interpretation becomes clear when we recognize that decisions made 
to investigate dangerous and criminal activity are more than simply discre-
tionary decisions about when to investigate or search a particular individual 
at a micro level, but are also macro-level decisions determining the scope of 
executive power and, correspondingly, the amount of privacy, security, and 
political authorit<; that the public enjoys and exercises. Accordingly, I ar-
gued that the Fourth Amendment requires that searches conducted with new 
surveillance technologies must be treated as searches subject to Fourth 
Amendment restraints. Technologically assisted searches must either comp-
ly with the Warrant Clause or be authorized by a statute containing safe-
guards constitutionally equivalent to the protections afforded by the Warrant 
Clause. Only then are the people the supreme political authority, not their 
representatives. 
James Risen & Eric Lichtblau, Bush Lets US. Spy on Callers Without Courts, N.Y. 
TIMES, Dec. 16, 2005, at Al. 
4 See OFFICE OF INSPECTORS GEN. OF THE DEP'T OF DEF. ET AL., UNCLASSIFIED REPORT ON 
THE PRESIDENT'S SURVEILLANCE PROGRAM (Jul. 10, 2009) [hereinafter OIG REPORT], availa-
ble at http://www.fas.org/irp/eprint/psp.pdf. 
5 The President's Radio Address, 41 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 1881 (Dec. 26, 2005), 
available at http://www.gpoaccess.gov/wcomp/2005.html. 
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Not only do the PSP and the actions taken by the President and 
Congress to authorize the PSP fail to satisfy these requirements, but also 
this program presents a problem I only alluded to in a hypothetical: "Could 
Congress ... satisfy the Fourth Amendment requirement of reasonableness 
by simply passing a law authorizing law enforcement to adopt and use any 
technology it chooses?"6 In other words, would it be consistent with the 
Constitution for Congress to essentially issue the President a blank check to 
engage in surveillance? At the time, I wrote: 
Assuming that a legislature would pass such a statute, a highly dubious 
proposition, the answer must be no. While such a statute might satisfy the 
doctrine of separation of powers, it does nothing to address the concerns 
embodied in the Fourth Amendment. Such a statute does nothing to limit 
police discretion at either the macro or micro level. While legislatures may 
delegate broad discretionary powers to the executive branch in other areas 
of constitutional law, the Fourth Amendment would appear to limit such a 
delegation with respect to searches and seizures.7 
This essay explains and elaborates upon this argument in light of the PSP 
and FISA Amendment Act of 2008 (FAA) demonstrating why a jurispru-
dence focused upon privacy fails to recognize and even obscures the vital 
constitutional interests at stake. 
Part II of this essay briefly describes the PSP, the arguments that 
have been made, and the steps taken to defend the constitutionality of the 
program. While there are multiple sources of information on this topic, this 
essay draws primarily from the unclassified report on the PSP prepared by 
the Office of the Inspectors General. Drawing heavily on my earlier work 
on the subject, parts III and IV outline the arguments I have made regarding 
surveillance under our Constitution and why the reasonable expectation of 
privacy test ultimately undermines what should be more appropriately con-
sidered the right of the people to be secure. In Part V, this essay argues that 
the PSP perfectly illustrates the problems created by the Supreme Court's 
approach towards government surveillance and why, even after Congres-
sional authorization, the constitutional legitimacy of the PSP is still doubt-
ful. In short, what matters most is not some substantive right of privacy, 
the invasions of which we deem to be unreasonable, but the process by 
which the three branches of government investigate and prosecute danger-
ous individuals. 
Ku, supra note 1, at 1376. 
Id. at 1376-77 (footnote omitted). 
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II. THE PRESIDENT'S SURVEILLANCE PROGRAM 
In the weeks following the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, 
the President authorized the NSA to engage in new and highly classified 
surveillance activities including the warrantless interception of "communi-
cations into and out of the United States where there was a reasonable basis 
to conclude that one part to the communication was a member of al-Qa'ida 
or related terrorist organizations."8 This portion of the PSP was often re-
ferred to as the Terrorist Surveillance Program. Under that same Presiden-
tial Authorization, Other Intelligence Activities were also initiated, but the 
details of the authorization and those activities remain classified.9 However, 
it has been alleged that with the cooperation of some of the nation's tele-
communications providers, the NSA began monitoring domestic telephone 
and Internet communications on an unprecedented scale. 10 
Initially, even when limited to the Terrorist Surveillance Program, 
the PSP appeared to violate the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act 
(FISA), 11 which was enacted to "provide legislative authorization and regu-
lation for all electronic surveillance conducted within the United States for 
foreign intelligence purposes."12 Specifically, the PSP allowed the NSA to 
conduct electronic surveillance within the U.S. without a court order while 
FISA only authorized such surveillance pursuant to an order from the For-
eign Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC). FISA's requirement of an FISC 
order was intended to ensure that certain factual conditions and legal stan-
dards were satisfied, thus justifying the surveillance. 
Despite this conflict, the Bush Administration sought to justify the 
PSP on two grounds. First, it relied upon a threat assessment memorandum 
prepared by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). 13 As its description 
would indicate, this memorandum documented the intelligence agency's 
assessment of terrorist threats to the U.S. from al-Qaeda and other terrorist 
organizations and, therefore, supported the desirability for such a program. 
Second, the Bush Administration relied upon legal memoranda prepared by 
Deputy Assistant Attorney General John Y oo in the Department of Justice 
Office of Legal Counsel (OLC) to justify the legality of the program. 14 
According to the OIG report, in a November 2, 2001 memorandum: 
OIG REPORT, supra note 4, at 1. 
!d. at 5-6. 
10 In re Nat'1 Sec. Agency Te1ecomm. Records Litig., 633 F. Supp. 2d 949, 959 (N.D. Cal. 
2009). 
11 50 U.S.C. § 1801 (2008). 
12 S. REP. No. 95-701, at 64 (Mar. 14, 1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3973, at 
3977. 
13 OIG REPORT, supra note 4, at 6-7. 
14 !d. at 10. 
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Yoo acknowledged that FISA "purports to be the exclusive statutory 
means for conducting electronic surveillance for foreign intelligence," but 
opined that "[s]uch a reading of FISA would be an unconstitutional in-
fringement of the President's Article II authorities." Yoo characterized 
FISA as merely providing a "safe harbor for electronic surveillance," add-
ing that it "cannot restrict the President's ability to engage in warrantless 
searches that protect the national security." According to Yoo, the ultimate 
test of whether the government may engage in warrantless electronic sur-
veillance activities is whether such conduct is consistent with the Fourth 
Amendment, not whether it meets the standards ofFISA.15 
With regard to the Fourth Amendment: 
Yoo dismissed Fourth Amendment concerns regarding the PSP to the ex-
tent that the Authorizations applied to non-U.S. persons outside of the 
United States. Regarding those aspects of the program that involved inter-
ception of the international communications of U.S. persons in the United 
States, Yoo asserted that Fourth Amendment jurisprudence allowed for 
searches of persons crossing the border and that interceptions of commu-
nications into or out of the United States fell within the "border crossing 
exception." Y oo further opined that electronic surveillance in "direct sup-
port of military operations" did not trigger constitutional rights against il-
legal searches and seizures, in part because the Fourth Amendment is pri-
marily aimed at curbing law enforcement abuses. 
Y oo also wrote that the activity described in the Presidential Authoriza-
tions was "reasonable" under the Fourth Amendment and therefore did not 
require a warrant. In support of this position, Y oo cited Supreme Court 
opinions upholding warrantless searches in a variety of contexts, such as 
drug testing of employees and sobriety checkpoints to detect drunk drivers, 
and in other circumstances, "when special needs, beyond the normal need 
for law enforcement, make the warrant and probable-cause requirement 
impracticable." ... Yoo wrote that in these situations the government's in-
terest was found to have outweighed the individual's privacy interest, and 
that in this regard "no governmental interest is more compelling than the 
security of the Nation."16 
651 
With regard to the Other Intelligence Activities authorized as part of the 
PSP, Yoo argued, ''we do not believe that Congress may restrict the Presi-
dent's inherent constitutional powers, which allow him to gather intelli-
gence necessary to defend the nation from direct attack."17 Until his resigna-
tion in May 2003, Yoo's memorandum and its legal interpretation was the 
15 Id. at 11 (alteration in original). 
16 Id. at 12-13 (citations omitted). 
17 /d. at 13. 
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Bush Administration's primary basis for supporting the legality of the 
PSP. 18 
Following Yoo's resignation, his OLC replacement and the new 
head of the OLC were troubled by Yoo's legal reasoning, and they began to 
develop a new justification for the legality of the PSP. Rather than rely sole-
ly upon the President's inherent authority, the OLC's new position argued 
that the Congressional Authorization for Use of Military Force (AUMF) 
gave the President the authority for most of the PSP. Under this theory, the 
President was authorized to direct the NSA to engage in surveillance as part 
of the AUMF authorization that the President "use all necessary and appro-
priate force against those nations, organizations, or persons he determines 
planned, authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist attacks of September 
ll, 2001, . . . in order to prevent any future acts of international terrorism 
against the United States. " 19 As such, the OLC believed that the AUMF 
addressed concerns raised about the President's authority under the doctrine 
of separation of powers and the limitations imposed by FISA.20 Nonethe- ~ 
less, the OLC remained troubled that even that theory "would not be suffi-
cient to support the legality of certain aspects of the Other Intelligence Ac-
tivities that the President had authorized under the PSP."21 
While it is clearly outside the scope of this essay, what ensued is 
perhaps one ofthe most intriguing series of events and disagreements within 
the Executive Branch in U.S. history. White House Counsel Alberto Gon-
zales and the President's Chief of Staff Andrew Card attempted to convince 
Attorney General John Ashcroft to sign off on disputed aspects of the PSP 
even though Ashcroft was in intensive care recovering from surgery. Hav-
ing failed to obtain the concurrence of the Department of Justice, the Presi-
dent reauthorized the PSP for an additional forty-five days prompting 
threats of resignation from senior Department of Justice and Federal Bureau 
of Investigation officials including Attorney General Ashcroft and FBI Di-
rector Mueller.22 In light of these concerns within his own administration, 
President Bush "decided to modify certain PSP intelligence-gathering activ-
18 Id. at 19. 
19 Letter from William E. Moschella, Assistant Attorney General, to Pat Roberts, Chair-
man of the Senate Select Comm. on Intelligence; John D. Rockefeller, IV, Vice Chairman of 
the Senate Select Comm. on Intelligence; Peter Hoekstra, Chairman of the Permanent Select 
Comm. on Intelligence; Jane Harman, Ranking Minority Member of the Permanent Select 
Comm. on Intelligence, at 2 (Dec. 22, 2005) (citing Authorization for Use of Military Force 
Against September 11 Terrorists (AUMF), Pub. L. No. 107-40, § 2(a), 115 Stat. 224 (2001) 
(codified at 50 U.S.C. § 1541 (2006)) [hereinafter DOJ Letter], available at http://www.fas. 
org/irp/agency/doj/fisa/doj 122205. pdf. 
20 See OIG REPORT, supra note 4, at 20. 
21 Id. 
22 /d. at I, 21-26. 
2010] UNLIMITED POWER 653 
ities and to discontinue certain Other Intelligence Activities that DOJ be-
lieved were legally unsupported."23 In 2007, the President issued his final 
Presidential Authorization for the PSP because certain aspects of the PSP 
were authorized by orders from the FISC.24 
Congress subsequently amended FISA giving the President the au-
thority to engage in electronic surveillance of persons reasonably believed 
to be located outside the U.S. without a court order. Initially, this authoriza-
tion was temporary under the Protect America Act,25 but it became perma-
nent under the FISA Amendment Act of 2008 (F AA).26 While the FAA is 
most commonly known for providing telecommunications providers with 
immunity from civil liability for assisting the Bush Administration under 
the PSP, 27 it also established the process under which the President could 
engage in such surveillance in the future. Specifically, the FAA permits the 
Attorney General and the Director of National Intelligence to authorize 
jointly "the targeting of persons reasonably believed to be located outside 
the United States to acquire foreign intelligence information."28 However, 
the investigation: 
(1) may not intentionally target any person known at the time of acquisi-
tion to be located in the United States; 
(2) may not intentionally target a person reasonably believed to be located 
outside the United States if the purpose of such acquisition is to target a 
particular, known person reasonably believed to be in the United States; 
(3) may not intentionally target a United States person reasonably believed 
to be located outside the United States; 
(4) may not intentionally acquire any communication as to which the 
sender and all intended recipients are known at the time of the acquisition 
to be located in the United States; and 
(5) shall be conducted in a manner consistent with the fourth amendment 
to the Constitution of the United States.Z9 
To ensure compliance with these limitations, the FAA requires the Attorney 
General and the Director of National Intelligence to adopt targeting and 
23 Jd at 29. 
24 See Letter from Alberto Gonzales, Attorney General, to Patrick Leahy and Senator 
Arlen Specter, Chairmen of the Comm. on the Judiciary (Jan. 17, 2007), available at http:// 
graphics8.nytimes.com/packages/pdflpolitics/20060 117 gonzales_ Letter.pdf. 
25 Pub. L. No. ll0-55, 121 Stat. 552 (2007). 
26 Pub. L. No. ll0-261, 122 Stat. 2436 (codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. § 1881(a) 
(2006)). 
27 50 U.S.C. § 1885. 
28 Id. § 1881a(a). 
29 Id. § 1881a(b). 
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minimization procedures and guidelines.30 The targeting and minimization 
procedures must be approved by the FISC.31 Moreover, while there are ex-
ceptions for exigent circumstances, 32 the Attorney General and the Director 
of National Intelligence must submit under oath and seal a written certifica-
tion to the FISC before an acquisition may begin.33 This certification must 
attest that the acquisition will comply with the targeting and minimization 
procedures and guidelines, among other things.34 The FISC can review the 
certification only to determine whether the required information is in-
cluded.35 
III. THE RIGHT TO BE SECURE 
To understand the constitutional deficiencies of the PSP, it is neces-
sary to briefly summarize that what I have argued represents the Founder's 
Fourth Amendment. Claiming that the Fourth Amendment protects power 
not privacy does not mean that the Fourth Amendment has nothing to do 
with privacy--the amendment clearly addresses privacy, or, more precisely, 
the right of the people to be secure. Rather, the amendment is best unders-
tood as a means of preserving the people's authority over the govern-
ment--the people's sovereign right to determine how and when the gov-
ernment may intrude into the lives and influence the behavior of its citizens. 
To paraphrase Justice Jackson, the Fourth Amendment protects more than 
privacy; it ensures that governmental invasions of individual privacy are 
based upon rules established by the people, rules our rulers must follow in 
order to engage in surveillance.36 Current Fourth Amendment doctrine not 
only ignores this principle, it subverts it. By limiting the Fourth Amend-
ment's application to instances in which the government invades a reasona-
ble expectation of privacy as defmed by the courts, the Supreme Court has 
shifted the authority for determining the scope of the government's inves-
tigative power from the people to judges and law enforcement. 
30 Id § 188la(d). 
31 Id § 188la(i)(l)(A). 
32 Id § 188la(c)(2). 
33 Id § 188la(g)(l)(A). 
34 Id § 188la(g). 
35 Id § 188la(i)(2)(A). 
36 Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 646 (1952) (Jackson, J. con-
curring) ("[O]urs is a government of laws, not of men, and ... we submit ourselves to rulers 
only if under rules."). 
2010] UNLIMITED POWER 655 
A. The Fourth Amendment and the Founders' Concerns 
While some have suggested that this thesis is radical/7 it is certainly 
more in line with the concerns that prompted the adoption of the Fourth 
Amendment in particular and the Constitution in general than the Supreme 
Court's current jurisprudence. According to conventional wisdom, the 
Fourth Amendment embodies the Founders' concerns over general warrants 
and writs of assistance as illustrated by three pre-constitutional search and 
seizure cases:38 Wilkes v. Wood/ 9 Entick v. Carrington,40 and the Writs of 
Assistance Case.41 These decisions are important because of two connecting 
themes: concern about the privacy of an individual's home and papers 
against the government and a staunch rejection of unbridled official power 
and discretion.42 For example, the Wilkes case arose in response to efforts to 
punish John Wilkes, a well-known member of Parliament, for seditious libel 
as the author of a series of anonymously published pamphlets critical of 
King George III.43 Lord Halifax, the British Secretary of State, issued a war-
rant that did not name Wilkes or any other individual by name, but instead 
directed officials "to make [a] strict and diligent search for the authors, prin-
ters and publishers of a seditious and treasonable paper" and "to apprehend 
and seize [them], together with their papers."44 The officials carrying out the 
37 See Christian M. Halliburton, How Privacy Killed Katz: A Tale of Cognitive Freedom 
, and the Property of Personhood as Fourth Amendment Norm, 42 AKRON L. REv. 803, 848-
49 (2009) ("Professor Raymond Ku has argued the now radical proposition that the Fourth 
Amendment is about power, not about privacy."). 
38 See, e.g., Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 463 (1928) (noting that the "well 
known historical purpose of the Fourth Amendment" was "directed against general warrants 
and writs of assistance"). There is some debate over the relative importance of the writs of 
assistance. Compare AKHlL REED .AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: CREATION AND 
RECONSTRUCTION 66 n. * (1998) (arguing that the writ of assistance case played "very little 
role in the discussion leading up to the Fourth Amendment"), with Tracy Maclin, The Cen-
tral Meaning of the Fourth Amendment, 35 WM. & MARY L. REv. 197, 223-28 (1993) (ar-
guing that the disputes over writs of assistance played an important role in colonial under-
standing of unreasonable searches and seizures). Because my argument does not depend 
upon the proper resolution of this debate, I will include the Writs of Assistance Case in this 
discussion. See William J. Stuntz, The Substantive Origins of Criminal Procedure, I 05 YALE 
L.J. 393, 396 n.9 (1995) (treating the Writs of Assistance Case as part of the Fourth Amend-
ment canon despite this debate). 
39 19 Howell's State Trials 1153 (K.B. 1763). 
40 19 Howell's State Trials 1029 (K.B. 1765). 
41 See M.H. SMITH, THE WRITS OF ASSISTANCE CASE (1978). 
42 Stuntz, supra note 38, at 399-400, 406-08 (identifying the two themes connecting these 
cases as privacy and unbridled official discretion). 
43 Wilkes v. Wood, 19 Howell's State Trials 1153, 1159-61 (C.P. 1763). 
44 The Case of John Wilkes, 19 Howell's State Trials 982 (K.B. 1763). 
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warrant arrested Wilkes and forty-nine other suspects by breaking into their 
homes and seizing their personal papers.45 
In response, Wilkes and several of the other suspects challenged 
their arrests by bringing trespass actions against the officials involved. In 
Wilkes v. Wood, Chief Justice Pratt instructed the jury that: 
The defendants claimed a right, under precedents, to force persons' hous-
es, break opon escrutores, seize their papers, ... upon a general war-
rant . . . , and therefore a discretionary power given to messengers to 
search wherever their suspicions may chance to fall. If such a power is tru-
ly invested in a secretary of state, and he can delegate this power, it cer-
tainly may affect the person and property of every man in this kingdom, 
and is totally subversive of the liberty of the subject.46 
The jury found for Wilkes, awarding him one thousand pounds in damage, 47 
and, in a separate suit against Lord Halifax, Wilkes was awarded an addi-
tional four thousand pounds.48 As William Stuntz notes, the cases arising 
out of these arrests "stand for the proposition that [general] warrants are~ 
invalid ... and that an·ests must be grounded in some cause to suspect the 
arrestee personally of a crime."49 To the extent that the Wilkes decision in-
fluenced the Founders, it suggests that the Fourth Amendment was adopted 
as a means of restraining official discretion. As the Chief Justice empha-
sized in his jury instruction, the question raised by the case is whether any-
one in the government has the power to search "wherever their suspicions 
may chance fall. "50 
The concern over official discretion was similarly echoed with re-
spect to writs of assistance. In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, 
British statutes gave customs officials virtually unlimited authority to search 
for and seize goods in violation of existing trade rules. 51 These writs of as-
45 Stuntz, supra note 38, at 399 (citing Wilkes v. Wood, 19 Howell's State Trials 1153, 
1157 (C.P. 1763); NELSON B. LASSON, THE HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE FOURTH 
AMENDMENT TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 43-44 (1937); GEORGE RUDE, WILKES 
AND LIBERTY 23-24 (1962)). 
46 Wilkes v. Wood, 19 Howell's State Trials 1153, 1167 (C.P. 1763). 
47 ld. at 1168. 
48 Stuntz, supra note 38, at 399 (citing LASSON, supra note 45, at 45). 
49 Stuntz, supra note 38, at 400; see also Maryland v. Garrison, 480 U.S. 79, 84 (1987) 
(noting that the prohibition of general warrants was one of the central purposes of the Fourth 
Amendment); Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 583-85 (1980) (stating a similar proposi-
tion). 
50 Wilkes v. Wood, 19 Howell's State Trials 1153, 1167 (C.P. 1763). 
51 For example, the Act of Frauds of 1662 authorized customs officers "to enter, and go 
into any House, Shop, Cellar, Warehouse or Room, or other Place, and in Case of Resistance, 
to break open Doors, Chests, Trunks and other Package, there to seize, and from thence to 
bring, any Kind of Goods or Merchandize [sic] whatsoever, prohibited and uncustomed." Act 
of Frauds § 5(2) (1662), reprinted in SMITH, supra note 41, at 25 (emphasis omitted). 
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sistance did not grant the authority to search; "rather, they enabled customs 
officers to compel others--constables, local officials, or even private citi-
zens-to assist in canying out the necessary searches and seizures."52 None-
theless, as Stuntz notes, because they permitted searches based only upon 
the suspicion of the customs officer, "the writs became wrapped up with the 
search authority they sought to confmn."53 As another commentator ob-
serves, much like the general warrant, "[t]he odious features of writs of as-
sistance were the unbridled discretion given public officials to choose tar-
gets of the searches," and "the arbitrary invasion of homes and offices to 
execute the writs."54 
Consider James Otis's now famous argument against the writs. Ac-
cording to Otis: 
A man's house is his castle; and while he is quiet, he is as well guarded as 
a prince in his castle. This writ, if it should be declared legal, would totally 
annihilate this privilege. Custom house officers may enter our houses 
when they please-we are commanded to permit their entry-their menial 
servants may enter-may break locks, bars and every thing in their way-
and whether they break through malice or revenge, no man, no court can 
inquire-bare suspicion without oath is sufficient. 55 
While Otis rhetorically invokes the right of privacy with his reference to the 
sanctity of the home, this right is clearly not absolute. The home is consi-
dered a castle only so long as the individual is "quiet" in it. This concession 
is quite appropriate and reasonable. Aside from questioning the validity of 
the underlying substantive crime, it is difficult to imagine any value that 
would justify an absolute right to hide evidence of a crime. 56 Accordingly, 
the problem with the writs was not the invasion of the castle, which is how 
privacy is commonly conceived, but the process justifying the invasion. The 
writs gave customs officers and their "menial servants" the right to enter 
any home whenever they pleased. The "liberty" Otis so eloquently argued 
for was not an absolute right of privacy, however defined. Instead, his liber-
ty is the liberty recognized in Wilkes, freedom from arbitrary and unlimited 
government power. 
52 Stuntz, supra note 38, at 405. 
53 !d. 
54 Shirley M. Hufstedler, Invisible Searches for Intangible Things: Regulation of Govern-
mental Information Gathering, 127 U. PA. L. REv. 1483, 1487 (1979). 
55 James Otis, Address, reprinted in SMITH, supra note 41, at 344. Put another way, the 
writs place "the liberty of man in the hands of every petty officer." ld. at 331. 
56 As Professor Stuntz has argued, Wilkes and Entick were essentially First Amendment 
cases in a regime in which there was not opportunity for direct substantive review. Stuntz, 
supra note 38, at 403. 
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The relative importance of limiting governmental power and discre-
tion versus defining what is private is apparent when one considers that only 
one of the cases in the triumvirate turned on an absolute right to keep in-
formation from the government. Like Wilkes, John Entick authored a series 
of pamphlets that authorities considered libelous.57 Unlike Wilkes, this was 
not a general warrant because Entick was specifically named. Nonetheless, 
Entick sued in trespass and was awarded three hundred pounds. 58 In uphold-
ing the jury's verdict, Pratt, now Lord Camden, concluded that "[p ]apers are 
the owner's goods and chattels: they are his dearest property; and are so far 
from enduring a seizure, that they will hardly bear an inspection. "59 Despite 
the fact that the government had obtained a valid warrant, the court con-
cluded that searching and seizing of papers themselves was impermissible. 
This conclusion was to be echoed in American constitutional law in Boyd v. 
United States,60 in which the Supreme Court held that one's papers are pro-
tected by the Fourth and Fifth Amendments. 61 
While the decision in Entick clearly recognizes the private nature of 
papers, most of Pratt's decision is spent questioning the authority and 
process by which the warrant was issued. In affirming the trespass verdict, 
Entick rejected the power and authority of the Secretary to issue a lawful 
warrant as well as the lawfulness of the process by which the warrant was 
issued and executed.62 Criticizing the power of the Secretary of State as 
"pretty singular,"63 he rejected the idea that the Secretary of State had the 
power to issue warrants that could not be challenged and reviewed by the 
judiciary64 or immunize its issuer and agents from subsequent prosecution.65 
According to Pratt, the laws of England did not grant the Secretary such 
power.66 Instead, the Secretary's claim "stands upon a very poor foundation, 
being in tmth no more than a conjecture of law without authority to support 
it."67 Similarly, Pratt considered the warrant unlawful because, even assum-
ing that it was supported by oath, it was executed ex parte, without notice or 
a chance to be heard, upon unknown information and informants, and its 
57 Entick v. Carrington, 19 Howell's State Trials l 029, 1031 (K.B. 1765). 
5 ~ !d. at 1036. 
59 Id at 1066. 
60 116 U.S. 616 (1886). 
61 Id at 634-35. 
62 Entick, 19 Howell's State Trials at 1059, 1063. 
63 Id at 1045. 
64 See id at 1045-59. 
65 See id at 1059-62. 
66 See id at 1057 ("The whole body of the law, ifi may use the phrase, were as ignorant at 
that time of a privy counsellor's [sic] right to commit in the case of a libel, as the whole body 
of privy counselors are at this day."). 
67 Id at 1053. 
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execution did not have to occur in the presence of a constable or the party.68 
These procedures were especially troubling because, if such a warrant were 
issued and executed against an innocent party: 
[H]e is as destitute of remedy as the guilty: and the whole transaction is so 
guarded against discovery, that if the officer should be disposed to carry 
off a bank-bill, he may do it with impunity, since there is no man capable 
of proving either the taker or the thing taken.69 
Fear of government power and discretion, therefore, runs through even the 
most privacy-centric decision. 
It should be apparent from these examples that a primary goal of the 
Fourth Amendment is the same as that of the entire Constitution-to define 
and limit governmental power. While the sanctity of one's home and pa-
pers,70 as well as public disagreement with the substantive offenses/1 clear-
ly played an important role in these early cases, fear of unfettered govern-
mental power resonates even more clearly. Moreover, to the extent the 
house and papers are to be protected, the text of the amendment, and its 
history suggest that the protection flows from restraining governmental dis-
cretion even when that discretion is specifically granted by statute. As Akhil 
Reed Amar suggests, the Fourth Amendment, therefore, is concerned with 
the agency problem, that is "protecting the people generally from self-
interested government."72 The amendment affords this protection not by 
defining what is private, but by expressly limiting the government's power 
to conduct searches. Accordingly, searches must be reasonable, and war-
rants may only issue when supported by probable cause.73 
B. Separation of Powers 
In light of this history, it should be apparent that the Fourth 
Amendment complements the doctrine of separation of powers. This doc-
trine addresses that one of the most perplexing problems of a government of 
laws and not of men is ensuring that the power wielded by the Executive 
Branch of the government, "whether wielded by a Prince or a President, is 
68 !d. at 1064-66. 
69 !d. at 1065. 
7° For example, in the Writs of Assistance Case, James Otis argued that "[a] man's house 
is his castle." Otis, supra note 55. In Entick, Pratt argued that "[p]apers are the owner's 
goods and chattels: they are his dearest property; and are so far from enduring a seizure, that 
they will hardly bear an inspection." Entick, 19 Howell's State Trials at 1066. 
71 See Stuntz, supra note 38, at 406--07 (arguing that the response to these decisions can be 
explained by public opposition to the underlying charges and offenses). 
72 AMAR, supra note 38, at 67-68. 
73 U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
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itself governed by and answerable to the law."74 Under American constitu-
tional law, this is accomplished by requiring, at least in the domestic sphere, 
that executive power be governed either by the Constitution or by statute. 
The executive's domestic role under the Constitution is best illustrated by 
the Supreme Court's landmark decision in Youngstown Sheet & Tube. 75 
In 1951, a labor dispute between steel companies and their em-
ployees threatened steel production during the Korean War. Believing that a 
work stoppage would jeopardize the war effort, President Truman ordered 
the Secretary of Commerce to take possession of and run the steel mills. 
The steel companies argued that the President's order violated the Constitu-
tion because it was not authorized by an act of Congress or any constitu-
tional provision. In response, the President argued, inter alia, that he had the 
inherent power to issue such an order or at the very least that it was part of 
his power to "take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed."76 Writing for 
the Court, Justice Black agreed with the steel companies and held that the 
"President's power, if any, to issue the order must stem either from an act of 
Congress or from the Constitution itself."77 With respect to the President's 
argument that the order was consistent with his power to execute-the laws, 
Black responded that "[i]n the framework of our Constitution, the Presi-
dent's power to see that the laws are faithfully executed refutes the idea that 
he is to be a lawmalcer."78 Instead, the Constitution limits his role to direct-
ing that "a congressional policy be executed in a manner prescribed by 
Congress," and the Constitution does not permit him to direct that "a presi-
dential policy be executed in a manner prescribed by the President."79 Since 
Congress did not authorize the President's actions, a majority of the Justices 
concluded that Truman's order was unconstitutional.80 
In his now famous concurring opinion, Justice Jackson argued that 
the President claimed a power that "either has no beginning or it has no end. 
If it exists, it need submit to no legal restraint."81 Recognition of such a 
power, he argued, would be a step toward dictatorship and was precisely 
what the Founders hoped to avoid by limiting the President's legislative 
power to recommendation and veto.82 According to Jackson, "[w]ith all its 
74 1 LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 4-1, at 630 (3d ed. 2000). 
75 Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952). 
76 ld at 584, 587 (quoting U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3). 
77 ld at 585. 
78 ld at 587. 
79 ld at 588. 
80 In fact, when it enacted the labor laws the President claimed to be enforcing, Congress 
had specifically considered and rejected the idea of giving the President the power to seize 
striking facilities. See id at 656-58 (Burton, J., concurring). 
81 ld at 653 (Jackson, J., concurring). 
82 ld at 653, 655. 
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defects, delays and inconveniences, men have discovered no technique for 
long preserving free government except that the Executive be under the law, 
and that the law be made by parliamentary deliberations."83 
Similarly, quoting Brandeis, Justice Douglas argued: 
The doctrine of the separation of powers was adopted by the Convention 
of 1787, not to promote efficiency but to preclude the exercise of arbitrary 
power. The purpose was, not to avoid friction, but, by means of the inevit-
able friction incident to the distribution of the governmental powers 
84 
among three departments, to save the people from autocracy. 
Thus, the doctrine of separation of powers protects against arbitrary and 
unfettered executive power by requiring executive decisions to be governed 
by either constitutional or statutory law. 
It should be apparent that the Fourth Amendment and the doctrine 
of separation of powers share the same goal and are intended to serve the 
same function. As a complement to the doctrine of separation of powers, the 
Fourth Amendment may play one of two roles. Either the amendment estab-
lishes the minimum requirements that must be satisfied before the govern-
ment may conduct a search when those searches are authorized by statute, 
or it guarantees that searches are always regulated by the Constitution even 
if they are not specifically authorized by statute. 
This brief discussion of the Fourth Amendment's history and its re-
lationship to the Constitution's separation of powers highlights two impor-
tant principles. First, the Fourth Amendment was not intended as a vehicle 
to define privacy; rather, like the rest of the Constitution in general and the 
doctrine of separation of powers in particular, it is intended to limit execu-
tive power and discretion. Second, the only legitimate authority for deter-
mining the reasonableness of any exercise of governmental power is the 
people themselves through the Constitution or their legislative representa-
tives by statute. 
IV. THE PROBLEM WITH PRIVACY 
In light of the Founder's concerns, it should come as a surprise that 
the Supreme Court's interpretation of the Fourth Amendment effectively 
stands the amendment on its head and, in so doing, shifts political authority 
from the people and their representatives to the executive and the judiciary. 
This power shift is accomplished by the way in which the Court frames the 
Fourth Amendment inquiry. In determining whether the Fourth Amendment 
applies, the Supreme Court asks whether the governmental activity is consi-
83 Jd. at 655. 
84 Jd. at 629 (Douglas, J., concurring) (citing Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 293 
(1926)). 
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dered a search under the Constitution. For the most part, this inquiry loosely 
examines whether the government act is equivalent to the types of searches 
our nation's Founders considered problematic. If the activity is considered 
equivalent, then it is treated as a search, and according to the Court, the 
Constitution limits governmental power by imposing the requirement of a 
warrant supported by probable cause. If the activity is not equivalent, then 
government agents have unfettered discretion to engage in the activity in 
question with no Fourth Amendment oversight or restraint. With respect to 
emerging technologies, this approach leaves open the possibility that, de-
spite the information gathering capabilities of these technologies, their use 
may not be regulated at all under the Constitution because, semantically, the 
Court may not consider their use to be searches. As others have noted, 
"[t]his approach fails to protect privacy rights, and permits their gradual 
decay with each improved technological advance."85 
Moreover, in engaging in this semantic game, the Supreme Court's 
current Fourth Amendment doctrine allows the government to determine for 
itself the scope of its own powers. This is accomplished by assuming that 
law enforcement has the inherent power to adopt and utilize new technolo-
gies subject only to narrow Fourth Amendment protections for privacy, and 
unless a search invades a recognizable privacy interest, the amendment 
places no limits upon the government's ability to conduct that search. In 
many instances this means that law enforcement, including individual offic-
ers, is not bound by any legal or constitutional restraints in deciding what 
surveillance devices to use or when and how to use them. 
In the abstract, allowing the govemment to obtain a suspect's secret 
password, to decipher encoded messages, or to monitor e-mail traffic may 
not trouble the casual observer. After all, these tools may not only make the 
government's job easier, but also, in some instances, they may be essential 
to combat technologically sophisticated terrorists and criminals. When in-
terpreting the Constitution, however, the judicial function is not to balance 
the relative value or efficacy of such tools against the corresponding loss of 
privacy and cost to society, but to detennine whether the people have made 
such a decision either in the Constitution itself or by conferring upon their 
representatives the decision-making authority to conduct such a balancing. 
Instead, the Justices have shirked this responsibility imposing their own 
value judgments upon society. 
85 Melvin Gutterman, A Fonnulation of the Value and Means Models of the Fourth 
Amendment in the Age of Technologically Enhanced Surveillance, 39 SYRACUSE L. REv. 647, 
650 (1988); see also David E. Steinberg, Making Sense of Sense-Enhanced Searches, 74 
MINN. L. REv. 563 (1990) (criticizing the incoherence of the Supreme Court's sense-
enhanced search cases and suggesting three factors that may better protect Fourth Amend-
ment privacy). 
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In defense of the Justices, the adoption of this interpretive frame-
work may be explained as recognition that it is often best to allow those 
investigating terrorism or criminal conduct significant discretion at what I 
will call the micro level--bow best to exercise power in a particular situa-
tion and when to investigate a particular individual. When dealing with 
danger and the unknown, government agents must have the power to protect 
themselves as well as the public in uncertain and highly fluid situations. 
Likewise, through their unique experiences, government investigators de-
velop special expertise and judgment, and society is better off when expe-
rienced officers are allowed to follow their hunches and target suspects to 
prevent harm from occurring or to capture the perpetrators after-the-fact. So 
when the government investigates a particular suspect, it is generally prefer-
able to allow those with the investigative expertise to determine who should 
be investigated and what tools should be used in that investigation. 
Deference, however, does not mean abandonment, and the Supreme 
Court's basic Fourth Amendment doctrine recognizes this micro-level con-
cern by requiring that warrants be issued by a neutral, disinterested magi-
strate after a demonstration that there is probable cause to believe that the 
evidence sought will aid in a particular apprehension or conviction of a par-
ticular offense, and that the warrant particularly describes the items to be 
seized as well as the place to be searched. 86 As such, these requirements 
ensure that the process is impartial, 87 supported by evidence, 88 and carefully 
tailored,89 all of which are responses to the lessons leamed from the cases 
involving pre-constitutional English abuses. 
-However, we should not confuse police decision-making at the mi-
cro level with macro-level decisions that determine the scope of executive 
power in general. While the Constitution may permit a degree of deference 
at the micro level, it leaves little room at the macro level. The decision to 
adopt a new form of surveillance technology is just such a macro-level deci-
sion. The decision to monitor telephone calls and email messages is a de-
termination to expand the powers and capabilities of the Executive Branch 
and, correspondingly, to reduce the level of privacy and security that the 
public may expect and enjoy. Whatever deference law enforcement may be 
entitled to with respect to micro-level discretion, it is entitled to none at the 
macro level. Unfortunately, the Court's current Fourth Amendment juri-
sprudence virtually ignores the distinction between micro and macro-level 
decision making and never questions from where the government derives its 
authority to adopt these new technologies. 
86 See Dalia v. United States, 441 U.S. 238, 255 (1979). 
87 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967). 
88 United States v. U.S. Dist. Court (Keith), 407 U.S. 297, 316 (1972). 
89 Maryland v. Garrison, 480 U.S. 79, 84 (1987). 
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The Supreme Court's failure to question the source of the execu-
tive's power to adopt new technologies leads to a significant incongruity. 
The individual officer, a relatively low member of the Executive Branch, in 
many respects has more discretionary power than the President. Unlike the 
President, whose power in general must be granted either directly by the 
Constitution or by acts of Congress,90 many of the activities the police en-
gage in are not authorized by law at all but are, instead, conducted under 
"their broad general duties to enforce the law and keep the peace.'m While 
the Supreme Court carefully scrutinizes presidential claims of inherent au-
thority, it appears to assume the President's inherent authority when law 
enforcement is concemed.92 In this respect, the Supreme Court's Fourth 
Amendment jurisprudence must learn from its evaluation of presidential 
power in the Steel Seizure Case. Unless the people grant the Executive 
Branch the power in question, either through the Constitution or through 
legislation, claims of inherent executive power are suspect. 93 As it stands, 
90 See Ku, supra note 1, at 1340-43. 
91 Anthony G. Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58 MINN. L. REv. 349, 
386 (1974); see also Dow Chern. Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227, 233 (1986) ("Regulato-
ry or enforcement authority generally carries with it all the modes of inquiry and investiga-
tion traditionally employed or useful to execute the authority granted."). 
92 One might argue that this assumption is warranted because state constitutions do not 
follow the same doctrine of separation of powers as the U.S. Constitution. While one can 
argue that state legislative power is broader than congressional legislative power, there is no 
support for the argument that the doctrine of separation of powers with respect to state ex-
ecutive power differs from the federal doctrine. As even a critic of this approach recognizes, 
"federal precedent sets the terms for much state separation of powers debate, and federal 
principles provide a presumptive standard for state constitutional decisions." Robert A. Sha-
piro, Contingency and Universalism in State Separation of Powers Discourse, 4 ROGER 
WILLIAMS U. L. REv. 79, 80 (1998); see also People v. Moore, 102 N.E.2d 146, 151-52 (Ill. 
1951) (recognizing that the doctrine of separation of powers only permitted the police to 
seize items specifically defined by state statute); Ronald J. Allen, The Police and Substantive 
Rulemaking: Reconciling Principle and Expediency, 125 U. PA. L. REV. 62, 77 (1976) 
("[T]he state supreme courts have uniformly held that the legislatures are the only branch of 
government possessing the power to legislate."). 
93 See Ku, supra note l, at 1340-43; see also Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 
343 u.s. 579, 587-88 (1957). 
!d. 
In the framework of our Constitution, the President's power to see that the laws are 
faithfully executed refutes the idea that he is to be a lawmaker. The Constitution 
limits his functions in the lawmaking process to the recommending of laws he 
thinks wise and the vetoing of laws he thinks bad. And the Constitution is neither 
silent nor equivocal about who shall make laws which the President is to execute. 
When the President acts in absence of either a congressional grant or denial of au-
thority, he can only rely upon his own independent powers [granted by the Consti-
tution] .... When the President takes measures incompatible with the expressed or 
implied will of Congress, his power is at its lowest ebb .... Presidential claim to a 
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under the Court's current approach, the people play absolutely no role in 
determining the extent and reasonableness of the government's power to 
search. Instead, the Court treats law enforcement as having unfettered gov-
ernment power to invade individual privacy and security subject only to a 
few not-sa-well-defined but limited exceptions defmed by the Court. What-
ever role the Fourth Amendment might have played in regulating executive 
power consistently with the doctrine of separation of powers, in many in-
stances it currently plays no role whatsoever. As discussed earlier, this state 
of affairs is precisely what the Founders feared most. 
So what does the Constitution require? Under these circumstances, 
self-governance may be reinforced in two ways. If the Court maintains the 
per se rule against warrantless searches--what I have described as the 
"moderate thesis"--popular sovereignty is reinforced through the Fourth 
Amendment's Warrant Clause. This result is a perfectly reasonable and ac-
ceptable interpretation of the amendment and consistent with the principles 
of constitutional self-governance. If the Court chooses to expand its inter-
pretation of reasonableness--what I have called the "radical thesis"--then 
reasonableness should only be expanded to include surveillance technolo-
gies authorized and circumscribed by statute with safeguards comparable to 
the requirements of the Warrant Clause. Under both of these approaches, the 
people, as the Founders intended, would determine the reasonableness of 
government power. 
As the discussion of the amendment's pre-constitutional origins 
suggests, thcc Fourth Amendment could recognize two methods for deter-
mining when searches are reasonable. 94 The government could conduct a 
search without a warrant, provided that the people had the power to oversee 
those searches directly. Otherwise, the government must obtain a warrant 
supported by probable cause. Even though the Founders might have been 
concerned about warrants, the Fourth Amendment considers warrants rea-
sonable when they are supported by "probable cause, supported by Oath or 
affmnation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the 
persons or things to be seized."95 While a per se warrant rule narrows the 
methods for determining reasonableness--the common law jury or through 
legislation-a rigid adherence to the Warrant Clause still applies the 
people's defmition of reasonableness as expressed in the Constitution. Ac-
cordingly, a per se rule remains faithful to the amendment's purpose of en-
suring that the people determine when the government may search. As dis-
power at once so conclusive and preclusive must be scrutinized with caution, for 
what is at stake is the equilibrium established by our constitutional system. 
Id. at 637-38 (Jackson, J., concurring). 
94 See Ku, supra note 1, at 1332-43. 
95 U.S. CONST. amend. TV. 
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cussed above, the problem with the Supreme Court's Fourth Amendment 
doctrine was not the per se warrant rule, but rather the Court's willingness 
to create exceptions to the rule. By creating exceptions to the per se rule, the 
Justices replaced the judgment of the people with their own. 
In certain areas of Fourth Amendment law, the Court has in fact re-
laxed the warrant requirement in reliance upon statutory authorization or 
administrative rules to uphold warrantless searches.96 This expansion to 
technological surveillance is not required or necessarily desirable, but if it 
should occur, government use of technology absent a warrant should only 
be considered reasonable when authorized by a statute subject to judicial 
review. Only under these circumstances would the Fourth Amendment 
guarantee that the people determine the reasonableness of government 
searches and follow the Constitution's separation ofpowers.97 
While having law enforcement develop and implement a process for 
administrative rulemaking is certainly valuable and worthwhile regardless 
of its Fourth Amendment implications, it should not be allowed to eliminate 
the safeguards embodied in the Warrant Clause. As discussed earlier, police 
decision-making and discretion can be separated into micro-level decisions 
and macro-level decisions.98 Provided that they are followed, requiring in-
vestigative agencies to formulate internal rules and policies governing in-
vestigations would be a step towards limiting their agent's discretion at the 
micro level--that is, when and how to conduct searches. Administrative 
rulemaking, however, does not eliminate all concerns at the micro level 
because, standing alone, rulemaking does not guarantee that the rules ade-
quately address micro-level concerns or that they are followed in any given 
96 See, e.g., Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 872-73 (1987) (upholding state regula-
tions authorizing probation officers to conduct warrantless searches of probationer homes 
based upon "reasonable grounds"); New York v. Burger, 482 U.S. 691, 711 (1987) (uphold-
ing warrantless inspection of an automobile scrap yard because a "statute informs the opera-
tor of a vehicle dismantling business that inspections will be made on a regular basis."); 
Donovan v. Dewey, 452 U.S. 594, 603 (1981) (upholding warrantless inspection of coal 
mines under the Federal Mine Safety and Health Act provided that the inspection program 
"provides a constitutionally adequate substitute for a warrant."); Colorado v. Bertine, 479 
U.S. 367, 374 (1987) ("[R]easonable police regulations relating to inventory procedures 
administered in good faith satisfy the Fourth Amendment, even though courts might as a 
matter of hindsight be able to devise equally reasonable rules requiring a different proce-
dure."). This limited relaxation of the warrant requirement in areas outside of day-to-day 
criminal investigation has been criticized as a form of privacy Lochnerism. See Stuntz, supra 
note 38, at 445; William J. Stuntz, Privacy's Problem and the Law of Criminal Procedure, 
93 MICH. L. REv. 1016, 1047 (1995). 
97 Of course, one could also expand reasonableness to once again recognize the role of the 
common law jury. See AMAR, supra note 38, at 70. Doing so, however, would require the 
Supreme Court to re-examine its positions on sovereign immunity, official immunity, and 
habeas corpus. 
98 See Ku, supra note 1, at 1367-77. 
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investigation. Furthermore, administrative rulemaking does nothing to alle-
viate executive discretion at the macro level. As such, allowing administra-
tive rulemaking to replace the warrant requirement suffers from the same 
fundamental problem of unbounded executive discretion. A dialogue on 
reasonableness would simply replace the dialogue on privacy with law en-
forcement and the judiciary calling the shots. 
In contrast, requiring the use of surveillance technologies to be au-
thorized by statute recognizes that the people should detennine just how 
much power the government should wield. As discussed earlier, popular 
control over the government's power to search was the driving force behind 
the adoption of the Fourth Amendment. Moreover, requiring statutory au-
thorization for law enforcement's power to searclr--even if it is not used to 
detennine reasonableness--would bring search and seizure law in line with 
the doctrine of separation of powers governing executive power in general. 
In addition to being the proper constitutional body to decide these 
questions, legislatures are institutionally more competent than courts to 
make the types of policy decisions associated with authorizing government 
surveillance. Since they are politically accountable, they are more likely to 
evaluate the policy implications of certain surveillance technologies, balanc-
ing, among other things, the threat to privacy and the potential for abuse. In 
other words, this is a balancing of the demands of public security from a 
potentially abusive government against the demands for public safety from 
groups and individuals who may do us harm. The legislative branch is also 
better able to develop a factual record with respect to the nuances and de-
tails of new technologies and their costs and benefits. Moreover, whatever 
one might think of the legislative process, it is more likely to take the inter-
ests of the general public into account in fashioning rules governing surveil-
lance than courts who are asked to make such decisions in cases in which a 
search revealed evidence of a defendant's guilt, and the only remedy is ex-
clusion of that evidence. 
Of course, allowing legislatures to detennine the government's 
power to search raises concerns about abusive or unresponsive legislative 
power. Admittedly, strict adherence to the warrant requirement avoids this 
problem by denying legislatures any power to deviate from the Warrant 
Clause.99 Concerns about legislative abuse, however, should be alleviated 
by judicial review of these legislative detenninations with the Warrant 
Clause as the guide. As the Supreme Court has done in the context of ad-
ministrative searches, it should review statutory grants of power to deter-
mine whether the procedures adopted by legislatures are "constitutionally 
99 One may argue that the tyranny of contemporary majorities is simply replaced by the 
tyranny of past majorities. 
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adequate substitute[s] for a warrant."100 Using the Warrant Clause as the 
touchstone for evaluating statutory safeguards would limit deviations from 
the amendment's stated safeguards while ensuring that the legislation li-
mited arbitrary and abusive searches. 101 Judicial review under these cir-
cumstances would return the judiciary to its traditional constitutional role of 
evaluating such judgments against a backdrop of constitutional principles 
and norms rather than allowing judges to sit as policymakers. While I have 
sketched two possible interpretations of the Fourth Amendment that would 
reinforce popular sovereignty, the question of which approach should be 
adopted is left for another day. Moreover, as the following section argues, 
the PSP fails to satisfy the demands of the Constitution under either the 
moderate or radical thesis. 
V. WHY THE PSP IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL 
In light of the history and changing legal justifications for the PSP, 
its constitutional legitimacy must be evaluated in essentially three separate 
moments. Each of these moments is represented by different legal argu-
ments in support of the program's constitutionality. The first of these mo-
ments is represented by the OLC's initial interpretation prepared by John 
Yoo. The second is the OLC's revised position relying upon the AUMF, 
and the third is represented by Congressional authorization of elements of 
the PSP following the passage of the FISA Amendment Act. Despite these 
three different moments and justifications, the constitutional legitimacy of 
the PSP remains suspect, as the following suggests, for different reasons. 
The initial defense of the PSP as articulated by John Yoo clearly 
falls into the Fourth Amendment's privacy trap that I have described and 
criticized above. Y oo ignores the question of separation of power and, in-
stead, assumes that the Executive had the authority to initiate the PSP sub-
ject only to the limitations imposed by the Fourth Amendment. 102 Yoo then 
argued that the Fourth Amendment did not limit Executive authority under 
100 Donovan, 452 U.S. at 603. 
101 Of course, the legislation should be subject to review in light of other constitutional 
concerns including equal protection. As one author has noted, 
The wanant requirement injects the judgment of a "neutral and detached" magi-
strate and also has what may be the more important effect of compelling a contem-
poraneous recordation of the factors on whose basis the action is being taken. The 
probable cause requirement obviously can't guarantee a lack of arbitrariness: invi-
dious choices among those respecting whom there is probable cause are possible. 
By setting a substantive parameter at one end of the decision, however, it at least 
requires that persons not be singled out for anest or search in the absence of strong 
indication of guilt, that is, on the basis of constitutionally inelevant factors alone. 
JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 172-73 (1980). 
102 See OIG REPORT, supra note 4, at ll-12. 
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the PSP because the NSA's activities would not amount to an unreasonable 
invasion of privacy. 103 While Yoo adopts an extremely aggressive position 
in favor of the PSP, his analysis is nonetheless consistent with the Supreme 
Court's interpretation of the Fourth Amendment pre-Kyllo. As such, his 
interpretation recognized no need to protect the right of the people to be 
secure at either the macro or micro level. Instead, the Executive Branch was 
free to invade the security of all Americans and arbitrarily target anyone it 
saw fit to target without any popular authorization or constraint. It should 
come as no surprise then that published reports indicate that innocent Amer-
icans were in fact inappropriately targeted, and government agents eave-
sdropped even on intimate conversations of members of our armed 
forces. 104 With respect to government surveillance, it is difficult to imagine 
a more egregious violation of our Constitution's protections and principles. 
The OLC's revised position represents a marginal improvement at 
best. By relying upon the AUMF, the OLC recognized that the doctrine of 
separation of powers was, in fact, implicated by the PSP. Moreover, we are 
told that some still classified elements of the PSP were not approved by the 
Department of Justice as a result of this interpretation, and that the Bush 
Administration subsequently abandoned those aspects of the program. 105 
Nonetheless, the OLC's position that the AUMF gave the president the au-
thority to initiate the PSP is also an extremely aggressive interpretation of 
the law. Under the AUMF, Congress gave the President the authority to 
"use all necessary and appropriate force against those nations, organiza-
tions, or persons he determines planned, authorized, committed, or aided the 
terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, . . . in order to prevent any future 
acts of international terrorism against the United States."106 While it is poss-
ible that Congress intended to give the President sweeping new surveillance 
powers under this language, it is by no means clear or certain. The dubious-
ness of this interpretation is compounded by the fact that one would also 
have to imply from the general language of the AUMF that Congress 
intended these new powers to be exempt from the specific limitations it 
had previously imposed upon electronic surveillance under FISA and other 
statutes. 
103 See id. 
104 See Spying on the Home Front, FRON1LINE, May 15, 2007, http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/ 
pages/frontline/homefront/view/#more; Brian Ross et al., Inside Account of U.S. Eavesdrop-
ping on Americans, ABC NEWS, Oct. 9, 2008, http://abcnews.go.com/Blotter/story?id= 
5987804&page=1. 
105 See discussion supra Part II. 
106 Authorization for Use of Military Force Against September 11 Terrorists (AUMF), Pub. 
L. No. 107-40, § 2(a), 115 Stat. 224 (2001) (codified at 50 U.S.C. § 1541 (2006)), DOJ Let-
ter, supra note 19, at 2. 
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Even if one accepts the argument that the AUMF authorized the 
President to adopt the PSP and that it constitutes specific statutory authori-
zation that would be recognized as an exception to FISA, the AUMF argu-
ment addresses only separation of powers and macro-level Fourth Amend-
ment concerns. Since the OLC continued to maintain that the PSP did not 
constitute an unreasonable invasion of privacy, it argued that the Fourth 
Amendment did not apply, and, therefore, none of the micro-level safe-
guards embodied in the Warrant Clause applied. 107 In essence, the OLC 
argued, as did John Yoo's initial memorandum, that the need "to detect and 
prevent a catastrophic attack" against the U.S. clearly outweighed any "pri-
vacy interests at stake." 108 Moreover, because the AUMF did not create 
alternative safeguards, it would not even qualify for consideration under the 
radical thesis of the Fourth Amendment. 109 In short, while the OLC's re-
vised position may support the proposition that the President had the power 
to initiate the PSP, it did nothing to ensure that the President was using that 
power appropriately. 
Finally, by adopting the FAA did Congress settle the constitutional-
ity of the PSP, at least with regard to the Terrorist Surveillance Program? 
Unfortunately, the answer is maybe. While the FAA clearly settles the sepa-
ration of powers and macro Fourth Amendment questions, it may fall short 
with regard to micro Fourth Amendment concerns. Under the FAA, Con-
gress gave the President the authority to engage in electronic surveillance of 
persons reasonably believed to be located outside the U.S. without a court 
order and required the Executive Branch to adopt targeting and minimiza-
tion procedures subject to the approval of the FISC before such surveillance 
could begin. 110 In general, the FAA is a vast improvement upon either of the 
OLC's positions. Congress expressly granted the President the authority he 
seeks. The authority granted is limited and must be exercised according to 
rules and procedures designed to protect the public and individuals from 
arbitrary surveillance and abuse of the granted surveillance power. 111 While 
the promulgation of these rules and procedures is delegated to the Executive 
Branch, the judiciary, as represented by the FISC, must approve the admin-
istration's rules and procedures before surveillance is authorized. 112 Under 
these circumstances, judicial review ensures that the rules and procedures 
adopted by the Executive Branch comply with the requirements of the FAA 
107 DOJ Letter, supra note 19, at 4. 
lOB Id. 
109 In light of OLC's aggressive interpretation, it certainly makes one wonder about the 
nature and scope of the surveillance activities under the PSP that were considered unsup-
ported by this position. 
110 See discussion supra Part II. 
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and the Fourth Amendment. As such, the FAA would appear to satisfy the 
macro-level concerns regarding such electronic surveillance. 
The difficulty with the FAA arises with respect to micro-level secu-
rity concerns. Because the FAA does not require a warrant, it fails to protect 
micro-level security as required by the moderate thesis. Therefore, the inter-
esting question is whether the certification procedures adopted by the FAA 
satisfy the radical thesis. In other words, is certification an adequate substi-
tute for the Warrant Clause's requirement that a search request be approved 
by a disinterested magistrate after a demonstration that there is probable 
cause to believe that the evidence sought will aid in a particular apprehen-
sion or conviction of a particular offense, and that the warrant particularly 
describes the items to be seized as well as the place to be searched? 
As noted earlier, in lieu of a warrant, the FAA requires the execu-
tive to submit a certification subject to the approval of the FISC to engage 
in electronic surveillance.113 The FAA defines what must be included in the 
certification, and primary among those elements are the certification that the 
acquisition complies with the targeting and minimization procedures and 
guidelines and that "a significant purpose of the acquisition is to obtain for-
eign intelligence information."114 The certification does not have to "identi-
fy the specific facilities, places, premises, or property at which an acquisi-
tion ... will be directed or conducted."115 This certification must be submit-
ted to the FISC, which reviews the certification "to determine whether the 
certification contains all the required elements."116 According to the FAA: 
If the Court finds that a certification submitted in accordance with subsec-
tion (g) contains all the required elements and that the targeting and mini-
mization procedures adopted in accordance with subsections (d) and (e) 
are consistent with the requirements of those subsections and with the 
fourth amendment to the Constitution of the United States, the Court shall 
enter an order approving the certification and the use, or continued use ... 
f h d fi h . . . 117 o t e proce ures or t e acqms1tJon. 
In light of this process, whether certification might satisfy the radi-
cal thesis of the Fourth Amendment depends upon how one interprets the 
obligation of the FISC. If the FISC must approve the request whenever all 
ofthe specified elements are included in the certification, then the FAA fails 
even the radical thesis because the FISC is not given any authority to deter-
mine whether the executive is exercising its power consistently with either 
113 Jd 
114 50 U.S.C. § 188la(g)(2)(A)(v) (2006). 
115 Jd § 188la(g)(4). 
116 I d. § 1881 a(i)(2)(A). 
117 Jd. § 188la(i)(3)(A). 
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the statute or the Constitution. Instead, the FISC would appear to be rele-
gated to ensuring only that the administration has dotted all the "i's" and 
crossed all the "t's." However, if the phrase "consistent with the require-
ments of those subsections and with the fourth amendment to the Constitu-
tion of the United States" applies to the certification itself, and not simply to 
the targeting and minimization procedures in general, then an argument 
could be made that certification may be an adequate substitute for a warrant. 
In other words, if certification not only determines that the general need and 
procedures for engaging in surveillance are reasonable, but also has enough 
teeth to ensure that each request is reasonable under the Fourth Amendment 
because the targeting and minimization procedures are reasonable as ap-
plied, then an argument could be made in favor of the FAA's constitutional-
ity. However, this argument will only succeed if the statute is interpreted in 
this manner, if the Supreme Court adopts the radical thesis for interpreting 
the Fourth Amendment, and if it relaxes or overturns its lOngstanding per se 
warrant rule. Unfortunately, that is a lot of "ifs" to support the constitutio-
nality of any program, let alone one of the most significant surveillance 
programs in this nation's history. Once again, while the FAA goes a long 
way to improve upon the earlier Constitutional deficiencies of the PSP, it 
may not get all of the way there. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Critics will certainly argue that lives will be risked and lost and that 
the rules are different when the nation is at war or faces a threat such as 
terrorism. This criticism, however, misses the mark. The relationship be-
tween public safety and our Constitutional liberties is not a binary, zero-sum 
relationship. Recognizing the importance of one does not diminish the im-
portance of the other. As represented by the Constitution's choice of words, 
they are mutually reinforcing values, both reinforcing our "security." Ob-
viously, when dealing with serious threats to public security, our agents 
should be equipped with and have the power to use powerful and sophisti-
cated tools and techniques. In general, this is not a question of whether, but 
how and when. One of the fundamental lessons this nation learned is that all 
power, including investigative powers, is easily abused and, as such, 
process matters. 
Accordingly, the issue is not whether the PSP is valuable. The pro-
gram and others like it may not only be valuable; they may be essential for 
our safety, but so too is the Constitution. The issue is who gets to make the 
macro and micro-level decisions of whether to have such a program and 
when to use it. As this essay argues, while the PSP may be unconstitutional, 
the constitutionality of the program is not difficult to fix. Either Congress 
can amend the FAA to expressly require compliance with the Warrant 
Clause or a constitutionally adequate alternative comparable to the Warrant 
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Clause, or the FISC can interpret the certification process in the FAA as 
already requiring the incorporation of such safeguards. 
Some will argue that it is more expedient or more efficient to leave 
these decisions to the Executive Branch rather than to the people, as ex-
pressed by the limits imposed by the Constitution either through the Fourth 
Amendment directly or by requiring legislative authorization and safeguard-
ing. Others will argue that it is more expedient for Congress to issue the 
President a blank check when it comes to the war on terror, drugs, or crime. 
I challenge the premise that our Constitution is inefficient or that it stands in 
the way of security. The Constitution does not deny the government the 
power to keep our nation safe, but rather keeps our nation safe by ensuring 
that our representatives, even the President, do not abuse the power we en-
trust to them. The Constitution was adopted to preserve liberty, and there is 
no more important means of preserving liberty, especially in times of crisis, 
than prohibiting the exercise of unlimited and arbitrary power. 
